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Differences in country size exacerbate the inefficiency of tax
competition, harming both a smaller country and a larger one.
But different fonns of tax cooperation can have very different
effects.  The smaller country would lose from harmonizing tax
rates, but both would gain from imposing a minimum tax. T'he
optimal joint response to freer cross-border trade, however, may
be to do absolutely nothing.
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Which  kinds  of countries  choose  to  become  tax  havens? What  is the  likely
pattern  of taxation  in  a border-free  "Europe  1992"  if  there  is  no central
coordination  of tax rates?  Are there  simple  forms  of coordination  from
which all  -Member  States could expeot  to benefIt?  Is  harmonizations
desirable?  Would  the  US be wise  to  Insist  on a minimum  tax  requirement  on
key economic  activities  in moving  to free trade  with  Mexico? Or Is it
Mexico  that  should  seek  such  a condition?  If  two  countries  make  It  easier
for  goods  to  move  between  them,  how  should  they  adjust  their  domestic  tax
structures?
These  and other  policy  questions  reflect  the Increasing  strain  that the
internationalisation  of economic  activity  Is placing  on national  tax
structures  designed  for a less  integrated  world.  For  free international
movement  of goods and capital  means,  in large  part,  free International
movement  of tax  bases. The  pressures  that  this  creates  are  most  evident  In
the  European  Community  (EC),  where  the  Intended  removal  of  all  controls  on
movement  between  Member  States  - a  central  component  of  the  1992  programme  -
jeopardises  their  ability  to  enforce  what  are  currently  widely  divergent  tax
structures.  But similar  problems  arise  in  other  parts  of the  world,  and
indeed  seem set to become Increasingly  pressing.  The Indirect  tax
differentials  exposed  by  the  free  trade  agreement  between  the  US  and  Canada,
for  Instance,  appear  to  have  generated  considerable  tax-induced  cross-border
trade.  2  Free  trade  with  Mexico  seems  likely  to  lead  to  even  more  severe
problems.  Nor  are  these  concerns  only for  developed  economies.  How  should
Ghana  and  C6te  d'Ivoire  set  their  producer  taxes  on cocoa,  for instance,
given  producers'  ability  to  smuggle  their  output  across  the  border  between
them?
The  purpose  of this  paper is to develop  a model  that  is rich  enough  to
The  term  'harmonisation' has  come  to  be  Interpreted  in  a  number  of  ways.
We  mqan  by  It  convergence  of  tax  rates  across  Jurisdictions towards  some
average  of  their  Initial  valvos.  This  purely  descriptive  ensoe is  the  one
which closest  matches  traditional  usage In the policy  debate  In  Europe.
2This  Is  casual  empiricism:  only  anecdotal  evidence  currently  seems
available.  See  Gordon  (1990)  for  a  broader  aesesnment  of  the  tax  Issues
raised  by free  trade between  the US and Canada.
1capture  some  of  the  central  features  of  the  interaction  between  national  tax
systems  in  an integrated  world  but simple  enough  to  yield  sharp  insights
Into  some  of the central  questions  - Including  those  above  - which  that
interact).on  raises.
The  underlying  general  theme  is  the  comparison  between  tax  competition  and
tax  cooperation.  This  Is  also  a concern  within  federal  tax  structures,  and
has received  considerable  attention  In the flscal  federalism  literature.
Gordon (1983), In particular,  provides  a  general analysis  of  both
non-cooperative  and cooperative  tax setting  within  a  federal  structure
consisting  of two levels  of government  (non-cooperative  here  meaning  that
each  lower-level  Jurisdiction  sets  the  taxes  at  Its  disposal  to  maximise  the
welfare  only  of Its  own  residents,  cooperative  that  all  taxes  are  chosen  to
maximise  some  social  welfare  function  defined  over  all  nationals). 3 There
are  Indeed strong analytical  similarities  between the  federal and
international  problems: many  of the  problems  that  the  European  Community
currently  faces  are  ones  that  federal  states  have  lived  with  for  decades.
Lived  with,  but  perhaps  not  resolved.  In  the  US,  for  instance,  Interstate
bootlegging  of  cigarettes  has  long  been  a serious  concern.  4 More  recently
mail  order  sales  have also  emerged  as a sizeable  (and  growing)  problem. 5
And  even  a revenue  loss  of zero,  it  should  be  stressed.  is  consistent  with
the existence  of a substantial  policy  problem,  since It could  reflect
spontaneous  harmonization  through  Inefficient  interstate  tax competition.
While  our  analysis  may  thus  have  a  bearing  on  problems  of  fiscal  federalism,
Aspects  of  non-cooperative  tax  setting  In  a  federal  context  are  also
examined  by, for Instance,  Arnott  and Grieson (1981)  and Wilson (1986).
The  Advisory  Comnission  on  Intergovernmental  Relations  (1977)  estlmated
that  In  ten  states  the  revenue  foreqono  through  amuggling  was  over  15X  of
cigarette  tax  receipts,  while  four  or  five  other  states  were  substantial
gainers:  New  Hampshire,  for  example,  was  estimated  to  receive  nearly  SOX  of
Its  cigarette  tax  revenue  from  sales  to  bootleggers.  The  report  also
documents  the  heavy  Involvement  of  organised  crime;  In  one  tax  officlil's
view  "smt%ggilng cigarettes  Is  the  next  most  profitable  enterprise  for  the
mob...to  narcotics[;0  sore  lucrative  than  numbers  and  prostitution"  (p.112).
More  recently,  Becker,  Grossman  and  Murphy  (1990)  repeatedly  find  that  tax
Incentives  to  smuggle  have  a  statistically  signiticant  effect  on  state
cigarette  sales.  See  also  Fox  (1986) and  the  references therein  for  further
evidence  on tax-related  Interstate  shopping  In the US.
Duncan  (1989)  puts  the  revenue  loss  on  untaxed  Interstate mail  orders  at  a
sizeable  $2.5  billion  per annum.
2the  absence of  an  over-arching sovereign authority with  considerable
revenue-raising  powers  of its  own  means  that  the  practical  policy  options  In
the International  context  with which we are principally  concerned  are very
different from - and more limited  than - those available  In the federal
setting.  Closer  to the  present  analysis  both in its  concerns  and  still  more
In the explicit  game-theoretic  approach  It adopts  Is the  work of Mintz  and
Tulkens  (1986), extended by  de  Crombrugghe  and  Tulkens (1990).  This
examines  non-cooperative  and cooperative  commodity  tax  setting  in a general
equilibrium  model of two countries  trading  In two goods,  costly transport
between the  two preventing complete equalisation  of  tax-inclusive  goods
prices.
A hallmark  of much  previous  work  on tax  competition  has  been Its  generality:
Gordon (1983)  and Mintz and Tulkens (1986),  for Instance,  place no or few
restrictions on  the  structure of  consumer preferences.  This has  the
advantage  of uncovering  as fully  as possible  the  qualitative  inefficiencies
liable  to arise  from  uncoordinated  tax-setting. But  generality  in this  area
Is not without cost.  In the model of Mintz and Tulkens (1986), for
Instance, Intrinsic discontinuities  In the  two countries'  best response
curves  mean that  a non-cooperative  equilibrium  In  pure strategies  cannot  in
general  be shown to exist.  Even If one  does, few general  characterizat3on
results are available;  and any kind of comparative  statics,  such as an
examination  of  the welfare effects of harmonizing  taxes to some common
level,  rapidly  becomes  intractable. While  one  cannot  hope  for  any  perfectly
general  conclusions  on such  matters,  one can  hope for  more sharply  focussed
lnsights  into  the  central  Issues. For this  one  must  look  to simpler  models,
and that Is the  approach  adopted  here.  By reducing  the  problem  to  a few  key
components  we are able, for Instance,  not only to prove  the existence  of a
unique non-cooperative  equilibrium  but  to derive closed forms for  the
associated  tax  rates.  Comparative  static  analysis,  both local  and  discrete,
proves  to  be relatively  straightforward.
Our  model  is also designed to focus on  a  consideration  which  casual
empiricism  suggests  to  be  of  considerable significance In  shaping
international  tax  relations:  the  relative  sizes  of the  economies  Involved.
Switzerland  and the  Isle of Man are not  large countrles.  Particularly
Important  in the EC context  Is.Luxembourg,  notable  for Its  relatively  light
3taxation  of both goods and capital  Income.  Indeed  the  particular  problems
that Luxembourg  perceives In aligning  its tax structure  more closely  with
those  of  other  Member  States 6 are  a  central concern In  evaluating
coordination  proposals  for  the  EC, since  fiscal  measures  - unlike  almost  all
others - still  require unanimity amongst Member States.  Surprisingly
enough, the role of size In strategic  tax design  seems  previously  to have
received  no explicit  attention. 7 Here It will be a primary  concern.  It
will  be  seen,  for  Instance, that disparity in  size  Is  a  source of
Inefficiency  in Itself,  exacerbating  the  loss  that  each  country  suffers  as a
consequence  of non-cooperative  behaviour.
Section  2 describes  our model.  This Is cast in the  literally  spatial  terms
of cross-border  shopping  induced  by tax differentials  on some consumption
good, but can be interpreted  much more generally.  Cross-border  shopping
- broadly interpreted  to include purchases for resale - Is Indeed the
central  concern  behind  the indirect  tax  proposals  in the  EC. 8 It Is already
a  serious problem in much of Europe: not  only In countries bordering
Luxembourg  but also, for example,  between Eire and North Ireland. 
9 One
other feature  of the  model should  be emphasised. We assume  governments  to
be Leviathans:  the objective  of each Is to maximise  its  tax revenue.  The
analysis  can thus be viewed in either  of two ways: as providing  a public
choice  perspective  on strategic  aspects  of tax-setting  In an international
context  (our results then being  thought of  as  positive rather  than
normative),  or - our  preferred  interpretation  - as a conventional  welfarist
treatment  of such Issues  for the  case in which consumers  place a very high
marginal  valuation  on some  public  good  which  tax  revenue  goes to  finance.
Assuming  that  purchases  by  non-residents  are  eliminated,  van  Leeuwen  and
Tang  (1991)  estimate,  for  Instance,  that  the  European  Commission's  1987
proposals  (see  footnote  10)  would  reduce  Luxembourg's  value-added  tax  (VAT)
revenues  by  up  to  16X.  Potentlally  even  more  important  Is  the  effect  on
revenue  from  excises  (cigarettes, alcohol  and  petrol),  which  are  marked  by
still wider International  tax differentials.
Its  potential  Importance  has  often  been  recognised  Informally,  as  for
example  in Gordon (1990).
See for Instance  paras 176  and 182 of Commission  (1985)  and Slinn  (1990).
FitzGerald  (1989) estimates, for  example,  that  In  1986  about  25  per  cent  of
all  spirits  drunk  In  the  Republic  of  Ireland  were  purchased  In  Northern
Ireland.
4Sections  3  and  4  characterise  and  investigate  the  outcome  under  unrestricted
tax competition,  modelled  as a  non-cooperative  (Nash)  equilibrium  In
tax-setting.  Partial  measures  of tax coordination  are then  examined  In
Section  5.  The  central  policy  options  here  have  been  clearly  raised  by the
current  debate  in  Eurone. One,  advocated  most  forcefully  by the  British
government,  is  to  leave  tax  competition  unfettered.  This  corresponds  to  our
non-cooperative  equilibr!um,  which  we then  take  as  a  benchmark  in  evaluating
two  forms  of  coordination  that  have  been  widely  canvassed.  The  first  Is  the
harmonization  of tax  rates  at  rome  common  level,  as  proposed  by  the  European
Commission  in  Its  original  1992  programme. 10 The  second,  and  that  currently
favoured  by the  Commission  (at  least  for  a period  of transition),  Is the
imposition  of a minimum  tax  rate.t  We establish  a clear  ranking  between
these  strategies. Neither,  however,  is likely  to be fully  optimal  as a
response  to  the  problems  associated  with  the  opening  of  borders.  Section  6
therefore  characterises  the  jointly  optimal  tax  structure  In  such  a setting.
It  emerges,  for  instance,  that  the  wisest  response  to  these  problems  may  be
to  entirely  ignore  them. Section  7  concludes.
2.  Taxes  and  cross-border  trade
The  model  is  a partial  equilibrium  one  of two  countries  and  a single  taxed
good. The  two  countries,  'home  '  and 'foreign',  lie  on  the  interval  [-1,11
with  a border  between  them  at the  origin:  see  Figure  1 (at  the  end  of the
paper). Within  each  country  the  population  is  distributed  uniformly.  The
sizes  of the  two  populations,  however,  may  differ:  adopting  the  convention
that  lower  case  letters  refer  to the  home  country  and upper  case  to the
foreign,  there  are  h individuals  In  the  home  country  and  H in  the  foreign.
We refer  to e  =  h/H  as  a measure  of the  relative  size  of  the  home  country,
and  say  that  h is 'small'  12 if  e<1.
Strictly,  the  Commission  has  argued  not  for  full  harmonization at  a  single
commont rate  but  for  'approximation' within  a  common  band  (Commission, 1985).
In  Its  1987  proposals,  the  standard  rate  of  VAT,  for  example,  was  to  lie
between  14 and 20 per cent (Commission,  1987).
11Commisslon  (1989).
There  are  other  ways  of  cheracterising differences  In  size;  that  used  here
Is  merely  the  simplest.  It  would  be  more  accurate,  but  would  become
5Taxes  are levied  on the  destination  basis,  In the  sense  that  each store  must
charge  the tax  rate  of the  jurisdiction  In  which it Is located. Enforcement
of the destination  principle Is Imperfect,  however,  in that there are Ao
border  tax  adjustments  on  purchases  made In either  country  by residents  of
the other.  This may reflect  either illegal  concealment  of trade or - as
Intended  by the European Commission  from 1993 - unlimited  allowances  for
duty-paid  goods  intended  for  personal  use.  13
Supply  and  demand  are  modelled  as simply  as possible. For the  former,  there
are assumed to be no barriers  to the entry or exit of new stores,  and no
fixed costs  once established.  In effect,  each consumer  thus lives  above a
store  at  which she  can  purchase  the  good at its  tax-inclusive  marginal  cost.
As will be seen,  the distribution  of stores  may well be far from  uniform  in
equilibrium:  there  may  be  a  desert  one  side  of  the  border  and  a  vast  mall
just  over  it.  But  stores  merely  respond  passively  to  tax-!rnduced
cross-border  shopping;  they  do not  attempt  to manipulate  it.4
On  the demand  side,  each  consumer  buys  one  unit  of  the commodity  if its  cost
to  her  Is  less  than  or  equal  to  her  reservation  price,  otherwise  she  buys
none.  Consumers'  reservation  prices  are  Identical  within  each  country  but
may  differ  between  them:  that  of  home  consumers  Is  v;  that  of  foreign
consumers  Is V.  We  assume  the  producer  price  of  the  commodity  to be  both
constant  and  the  same  In both  countries:  defining  the  reservation  prices  net
of  this  producer  price,  the  consumer  price  charged  at any  store  can  be  taken
to  be  exactly  the  tax  imposed  In  that  jurisdiction.  These  taxes  (in  per
15
unit  form)  are  denoted  by  t and  T.
'onsider  then  the  decision  problem  of  a  consumer  in  the  home  country.  She
cumbernome,  to refer  to e  as measuring  relative  population  densities.
There  are various  exclusions,  Including  mail order  purchases.
24See  Braid  (1987)  for  an  analysis  of  price  responses  to  spatlally
differentiated  taxes In a  model with Imperfectly  competitive  stores.
The  assumption  of  uniform  taxation  within  jurisdictions  is  restrictive:
differential  taxation  will  generally  dominate  In  the  open  border  setting
considered  below.  And  such  differentlation  Is  Indeed  sometimes  observed:
sales  taxes  are  I ower,  for  example,  In  countles  of  Washington  that  border
Oregon,  In  which  there  Is  no  sales  tax.  We  leave  this  extension, however,
for further  analysis.
6can  eithir  purchase  the  commodity  In  her  own  country,  where  it  is  available
to  her  at  her  doorstep  at  price  t,  or  travel  to (just  over)  the  border  and
purchase  it  In the  forelgn  country  at price  T.  Travelling  to the  border
(and  back)  entails  a cost  of  >O  per  unit  distance  from  the  frontier. 16
This Is most naturally  interpreted  as reflecting  literal  transportation
costs (including  leisure  foregone),  but the structure  might also be
interpreted  for  Instance,  In  terms  of a distribution  of transactions  costs
in  establishing  price  differentials.
Suppose  that  our  consumer  Is  located  at  a distance  s from  the  border.  Then
she will buy In the foreign  country  if and only If two conditions  are
satisfied.  The  first  is  that  the  surplus  she  enjoys  by  doing  so  exceed  that
from  buying  at  the  store  downstairs.  This  requires
v  - T - 8s  > v  - t
or  equivalently
(t  - T)/8  > s  (2.1)
The  second  Is  that  this  surplus  be  non-negative:
v - T - Ss >.  (2.2)
Figure  1 Illustrates  for  the  case  in  which  and  v > t  > T.  All  residents  of
the  home  country  living  further  than  (t-T)/8  from  the  border  will  shop  at
home,  while  the rest  will shop In the foreign  country;  we refer  to the
latter  as  cross-shoppers.  Assuming  that  V _>  T,  all  foreign  consumers  will
purchase  in  their  own  country.
Appropriately  reinterpreted,  this  structure  can  be  applied  to  a variety  of
international  tax  problems. For the  Ghana-C8te  d'Ivoire  problem  mentioned
in  the  Introduction,  for  instance,  the  consumers  become  producers,  the  'axes
become  levies  on production  and the reservation  values  become  the world
price  of  cocoa.  Or  one  might  think  of  multinationals  having  some  discretion
over the jurisdiction  in which their  profits  are taxed (through  their
location  decisions  or  by  transfer  pricing  between  affillaLes),  but  differing
16
There  to  some  direct  evidence  on  the  private  costs  of  cross-border
shopping.  Survey  data  for  the  Irish  Republic,  for  Instance,  suggest  a  cost
of about IRL0.42 (1986  prices)  per mile travelled  (FitzGerald,  1989).
7In  the  costliness  of  the  required.restructuring  of  their  activities.  17  For
brevity,  however,  the  discussion  will  be  cast  only  In  terms  of cross-border
shopping.
As emphasised  above,  the  objective  of each  government  Is taken  to be the
maximisation  of  its  tax  revenue;  all  subsequent  references  to  optimality  and
Pareto  efficiency  are to  be Interpreted  In  that  sense.is  When  the  border
between  them  Is  closed  - more  precisely,  when  the  destination  principle  Is
rigidly  enforced  - the  two  governments  can  entirely  Ignore  each  other  in
setting  their  tax  rates:  there  can  be  no  tax-induced  cross  border  shopping,
17
The  model  may  also  be  applicable to  problems other  than  those  of  taxation:
see for Instance  Burdett (1990).
One  further  aspect  of  this  deserves  elaboration.  The  tax  competition
literature  has  emphasised  two  externalities  that  one  country  Imposes  on
another  when  It  raises  Its  7.ax  rate  In  the  presence  of  cross-border
shopping.  The  first  Is  beneficial:  the  effect  on  cross-border  shopping
increases  the  tax  base  of  the  country  whose  tax  Is  unchanged.  Hintz  and
Tulkens  (1986)  call  this  the  'public  consumption  effect'.  The  second,
emphasised  by  Lockwood  (1990)  Is  harmful.  Non-residents who  shop  In  the
country  whose  tax  Is  Increased  lose  welfare;  the  'private  consumption
effect.'  By  taking  revenue as  our  criterion we  Ignore  the  latter.  In  the
policy  context  with  which  we  are  concerned,  however,  there  Is  an  Important
limitation  on  the  operation  of  the  private  consumption  effect.  The  key
distinction  here  Is  that  between  an  origln-based  system  of  coamodity
taxatlon  and  an  Imperfectly enforced  destination  basis.  Under  the  former  -
which  has  generally  been  assumed  In  the  literature  - goods  are  taxed
according  to  where  they  are  produced.  Under  the  destination  basis  - the
norm  for  International  taxation  under  GATT  rules  - goods  are  taxed  according
to  the  place  of  consumption.  The  concern  In  removing  border  controls  while
retaining,  formally,  the  destination  principle  (as  Is  planned  In  the  EC,  at
least  for  the  medium  ters)  Is  that  residents of  one  Member State  may  be  able
to  e-cape  Its  taxes  by  buying  duty-paid  In  another.  But  they  will  only  do
so  If  the  foreign tax  rate  Is  sufficiently low:  they  cannot be  made  to  pay  a
foreign  tax  in  excess  of  their  own  since  appeal  to  the  destination  prlnciple
enables  them  to  pay  at  the  domestic  rate  rather  than  the  foreign.  This
as  setry  means  that  despite  their  apparent  similarity  - In  particular,
arbitrage  conditions  relating  goods  prices  across  countries  will  be  the  same
In  the  two  cases  (Ignoring  transport  costs)  - an  origin  basis  and  an
Imperfect  destination  basis  Impi-*  very  different  Incentives  for  strategic
tax-setting.  If  Italy,  say,  ha-  a  monopoly  In  olive  oil  then  under  the
origin  basis  she  would  have  an  Incentive,  for  familiar  terms  of  trade
reasons,  to  tax  It  heavily.  Under  an  Imperfect  destination  basis,  however,
she  would  be  unable  to  enforce  this  tax  on  foreigners:  they  would  simply
reclalm  It  and  pay  their  domestic  tax  Instead.  Wlth  thre  retention  of  a
formal  destination  principle  the  scope  for  such  tax  exporting  is
considerably  reduced,  and  the  likely  importance  of  the  private  consumption
effect  consequently  diminished.  Removing  it  altogether  Is  crude,  but  serves
to focus  on what seem to be more contral  policy  Issues.
8and the assumption of a  constant producer price precludes any  Indirect
Interaction  through  terms  of trade  effects.  The nature  of the 'closed
border  optimum'  is then Immediate:  each government  will  extract  all the
surplus  of its own citizens  by setting  Its tax at the level  of their
reservation  prices:  that  Is,
to  =  v  ;  Tc  V  (2.3)
where  the  star  indicates  optimality  and  the  subscript  c the  closed  border.
When the border Is uncontrolled,  however,  we have a  very different
situation,  to  which  we  now  turn.
3.  Tax  competition
Here  we examine  the  outcome  when  the  border  is open  and tax  competition
between  the  two  countries  is  unrestricted.  More  precisely,  we characterise
and  investigate  the  non-cooperative  outcome  when  each  government  behaves  in
the  Nash  manner,  choosing  its  own  tax  rate  to  maximise  its  tax  revenue  while
taking  as  given  the  tax  rate  set  by  the  other  and  bearing  In  mind  the  impact
on  cross-border  shopping.
The first task is to derive  the best response  functions  19 of the two
governments.  This we do from  the perspective  of the  home  country,  the
analysis  for  the  foreign  country  being  analogous.  Thus  we  ask:  Given  T,  what
t  maximises  the  home  country's  tax  revenue?
We  start  by  assuming  that
v, V =  +W  ,  (3.1)
so  that reservation  prices do  not  constrain  governments  in  their
tax-setting.  This  assumption  - which  Is  not  logically  coherent  If  there  Is
some upper bound on consumers'  expenditure  - is for convenience  only;
having  exploited  the simplicity  it allows,  we return  below  to the more
Interesting  case  in  which  v and  V are  finite. Given  (3.1),  the  revenue  of
the  home  country  Is  readily  seen  to  be
To bo prociso  we should (and  occasionally  will)  speak  of correspondences.
9|  th{l  - (Li)}  I  t >  T  (3.2a)
(  th  +  tH(T  t)  ;  t  T.  (3.2b)
Suppose  for  Instance  that  t <  T.  Then  all h home  citizens  shop  at home,
giving  revenue  of th;  hence  the first  term in (3.2b).  In addition,  a
fraction  (T-t)/8  of the  H citizens  of  the  foreign  country  will  cross-shop,2
each  of  them  bringing  t  to  the  home  government;  hence  the  second  term.
It emerges  from the maximisation  of (3.2)  that the form of the home
country's  best  response  fun.ction  depends  critical:y  on its  relative  size.
It  Is  shown  in  the  Appendix  that  If  the  home  country  Is  the  smaller  of  the
two  (G  < 1)  then
{  ( +  T)  ;  T  dig
t(T)  - (3.3)
i(ae  +  T)  ;  T  a  6v
while  if  it  is  the  larger  (0  >  1)
(6  +  T)  ;  T  <6
t(T)  =  T  ;  sT  a  a  (3.4)
i(ae  +  T)  ;  T  .
There Is  thus  a fundamental  asymmetry  between  the  responses  of the small
country  and the large.  Consider  the case In which  the  home country  Is
small,  so that  Its  best  responses  are  as in (3.3);  this  Is Illustrated  in
panel  (a)  of  Figure  2.  At  very  low  levels  of  T,  it  is  optimal  for  the  home
country  to  set  its  tax  above  the  foreign: some  home  citizens  are lost  to
the  foreign  market,  but  the  foreign  tax  rate  is  so  low  that  it  Is  not  worth
reducing  the  domestic  tax  rate  to  a level  that  would  keep  them  at  home. As
T increases  it  is  at  first  optimal  for  the  home  country  to  Increase  Its  tax
too. Since,  from  (2.1),  the  extent  of  cross-border  shopping  depends  only  on
the  absolute  difference  t-T,  it  would  be possible  to increase  revenue  by
raising  the  home  tax  rate  one-for-one  with  the  foreign.  It  Is  even  better,
20
For  brevity,  we  Ignore  here  the  upper  bound  of  unity  on  the  proportion of
cross-shoppers: Lemma  3  of  the  Appendix  Impliles  thet  this  will  not  bite  at  a
non-cooperative  equi  librlum.
10however, to reduce cross-border  shopping  by increasing  the tax rate less
rapidly;  Indeed  (3.3)  shows  that  it  Is  optimal  to raise  the  home tax  rate  by
exactly half the Increase in the foreign tax rate.  As T  continues to
Increase,  however, it eventually  becomes sufficiently  high that the home
country can  now  increase its revenue  by a discontinuous  tax reduction  to
under-cut  T.  21  When the  home country  Is the larger  of the two  - the  0 >  1
case shown in panel (b)  - its revenue-maximising  tax  rate always  increases
with the  foreign  country's  tax  rate.  22  In  thls  case  there  Is  never  a gain to
be had  by a dramatic  shift to  undercutting:  given Its  smallness,  the  switch
in numbers  from the foreign  market is not enough  to make this the optimal
policy.
To  Investigate the  Nash  equilibrium we  now  assume, without loss  of
generality,  that  0 <  1:  If the  two countries  differ  In  size, It Is the  home
that Is smaller (a convention  we maintain until Section 6).  The home
country's best response  function  is thus  as In (3.3). The  foreign  country
then  being the larger,  its best response  Is found  by analogy  with (3.4)  to
be:
,(  + t)  ;  t  s  6
T(t)  =  a  t  s  /e  (3.5)
Wa(/9)  +  t}  t  2t  S/e  .
This Is Just the  reflection  around the 450  line of  the best response
function  In Panel (b)  of Figure  2.
Combining  the  best response  functions,  as in  Figure  3, the  discontinuity  in
that of  the  small  country makes  the existence of  a  Nash  equilibrium
problematic. Thus it is  striking  to  find:
PROPOSITION  1:  Assuming  v  =  V  =  ", there  exists  a  unique  Nash  equilibrium.
The  equilibrium  taxes  are:
[3  + (  (3.6)
Strictly,  t(T)  is  multi-valued  at the jump point  T =
There  Is  an  Interesting contrast  here  with  the  model  of' HIntz  and  Tulkens
(1986),  In  which  each  country's  best  response  correspondence must  have  at
least  one 'downward  jump' (Proposition  5, p.150).
11T  a.[  (3)  (3.7)
o2of:  We flrst  show that  there  cannot  exist  a Nash  equilibrium  with t  > T.
From (3.5).  the large  country  will set T strictly  below  t only If t >  5/0,
In  which case
T =  [(G5/e)  +  t]  ,  (3.8)
whilst  from (3.3)
t  =  1(8  + T)  (3.9)
whenever the home country finds It optimal to set a higher tax than the
foreign.  Substituting  (3.8)  In (3.9)  and  using  0 < 1  gives
t  ((1+  20)  < a
contradicting  the  condition  for the  foreign  country  to  wish to  under-cut.
Consider  then the  possibility  that  t  <  T In equilibrium.  From (3.3),  t(T)  <
t for  some t e t(T) lff  T 2  5V4',  In  which  case
t  ='(9  +  T)  . (3.10)
From (3.5),  T(t) >  t lff  t <  5, In  which  case
T  e  (  +  t)  . (3.11)
Solving (3.10)-(3.  11) gives the tax rates  In (3.6)-(3.7). Since 2+e-3V  =
(1-re)(2-V) >  0, the condition  T  N  6IV  for (3.10)  Is satisfied.  And so
long  as a  <  1 (3.6)  implies  that  also t  < 8, as required  for (3.11).
Finally,  it  Is straightforward  to  show from  (3.3) and  (3.5)  that an
equilibrium  with t =  T exists  iff e =  1, and that the common  tax rate Is
then  5; which Is  as in (3.6)-(3.7). [
We  now  dispense with  the  assumption of  infinite reservation prices.
Define  v  =  min[v,VY,  v=  max[v,Vl  and Introduce:
Assumption  Al:  5  < v
4ssumption  A2:  v  < 2v
Then:
12EMMITl12:  For  any  reservation  prices  satisfying  Al  and  A2,  {t,tTN  is
the  unique  Nash  equilibrium.
tggf:  See  Appendix.
Assumption  Al means  that  if the  good  were to be given  away  free in one
country  then  all  those  in  the  other  country  would  derive  positive  surplus  by
travelling  to the  border  to  collect  It.  This  simply  ensures  that  tN  Is
below  v and T"  below 23 V; if  this  were  not the  case,  the  equilibrium  of
Proposition  1  would  clearly  become  problematic.  Assumption  A2  requires  that
reservation  prices  In  the  two  countries  not  be too  dissimilar.  It  ensures
that  it Is in  neither  country's  Interest  to  price  its  own  citizens  out  of
the domestic  market  In order to extract  more revenue  from foreigners.
Suppose  for  instance 24 that  v is  very  slightly  below  V and  T  w.  Raising  t
from  v to  just  below  V then  causes  a discontinuous  loss  In  revenue  from  home
citizens  but,  at best,  only  a small  revenue  gain  from  cross-shoppers.  In
what  follows  we  assume  both  Al  and  A2  to  be  satisfied.
4. Properties  of  the  Nash  equilibrium
The  most  striking  feature  of the  Nash  equilibrium  is  the  asymmetry  stemming
from  the  difference  in  size  between  the  two  countries.  From  (3.6)-(3.7)
Tf  - t=  -. (1-e)  ,  (4.1)
and  hence:
PROPOSITION  3:  In equilibrium  the  small  country  strictly  undercuts  the
large.
The intuition  is straightforward.  Maximising  the  revenue  from  a commodity
tax  requires  a tax  rate  (in  ad  valorem  form)  equal  to  the  reciprocal  of the
elasticity  of  demand. In  the  model  used  here,  this  elasticity  comes  only
from  cross-border  shopplng.  Starting  then  from  a position  In  which  t = T,
Taking  the  Inequality  In  Al  to  be  strict  merely  removes  the  need  for  some
dull  qualifications  In stating  results.
The more  general  argument Is in Lemma 4 of the Appendix.
13the increase  in  demand that  either  government  expects  to Induce  by cutting
Its tax rate depends on the size of the other country.  Thus It Is the
smaller  country  that  perceives  the  higher  elasticity,  and  which  consequently
undercuts.  This result seems  likely  to extend  to models  more general than
that used  here.  It captures what  seems in practice to be  a  common
characteristic  of tax  havens:  their  smallness.
What of tax  revenues  In the two  countries? Using (3.6)-(3.7)  In (3.2b)  and
the  foreign  analogue  of (3.2a)  one  finds,  In  obvious  notation,  that
rN  3  H(r+26) 2 (4.2)
RN  =  6H(M  *  (4)3)
Consider first the comparison  between the Nash equilibrium  with an open
border  and the closed  border  solution  (2.3).  The large  country is clearly
worse  off: some  of Its  citizens  now cross-shop,  and those  who  do not  pay (by
(3.7)  and Al) less than V.  The Impact  of opening  the border  on the small
country Is less obvious: it loses revenue as a  result of  the implicit
restriction  on Its  ability  to extract  surplus  from its  own  citizens,  but in
equilibrium  gains revenue  from cross-shoppers. Part (b)  of the following
shows  that  the  latter  effect  will  dominate,  and  the  small  county
consequently  benefit from opening  the  border, iff the  differential  in size
Is sufficiently  great. Moving  from the  closed  border  solution,  in  which  all
surplus  Is extracted,  can clearly  never  increase  the  sum  of revenues  in the
two countries; part  (c) shows that It will strictly reduce collective
revenues:
PROPOSITION  4:  Moving from the closer  border solution  to the Nash
equilibrium  with  an  open  border:
(a) Strictly  reduces  revenue  in  the  larger  country;
(b) Increases  revenue  in  the  small  country  1ff  0 is  below  some  e*  e (0,1)
(c) Strictly  reduces  global  revenue.
Proof:  Parts (a)  and (c)  are  straightforward,  and  so omitted. For (b)  note
from  (4.2) that the gain to the small country In moving to  the Nash
equilibrium,  regarded  as a function  of G,  is
14f  () zr'  vh - HISj  -1v2  . (4.4)
The existence  of e  with  the  property  claimed  then  follows  on noting  that
f(()  Is  strictly  convex  with  f(O)  >  0  and,  by  assumption  Al,  f(l)  =  H(6-v)
< 0.  11
Note In particular  that If 9  =  1, so that the Nash equilibrium  Is
symmetric,  25 part (c)  Implies  that  opening  the  border  Is  Pareto-worsening:
both  countries  lose  revenue.
What  of  relative  tax  revenues  in  the  Nash  equilibrium?  The  smaller  country
charges  a lower  tax rate,  but since it  gains revenue  from cross-border
shopping  it  is  not  clear  that  this  will  necessarily  translate  into  a lower
level  of tax  revenue. From (4.2)-(4.3),  however,  one  finds  that  it does:
RN  - rN =  SH(-92  )/3  >  0. For  per  capita  revenues,  in  contrast,
R/h - r  /H =  -8(1-9  )/9e  I  0 ,  (4.5)
and  thus:
PROPOSITION  S:  At the  Nash  equilibrium,  tax  revenue  is  higher  in  the  large
country  than  In  the  small. Per  capita  revenue,  however,  is  greatest  in  the
small  country.
In  equilibrium,  the  tax  haven  country  thus  receives  more  than  Its  pro  rata
share  of  global  tax  revenues.
Turning  to comparative  statics,  the  role  played  by the 'transport  cost'
parameter  8  is  remarkable  In  two  respects:
PROPOSITION  6: Within  the  range  of  8  satisfying  Al:
(a) The amount  of cross-border  shopping  in the  Nash equilibrium  is
independent  of  transport  costs;
(b)  An  increase  in  transport  costs  is  strictly  Pareto-improving.
... 2.5  . . . . ..  . ..
There  Is  here  another  contrast  with  Hlntz  and  Tulkena  (1986):  In  the  model
used  there  no  symmetric  equilibrlum  exists  when  the  two  countries  are
Identical.
15Ero_f:  From the discussion  in Section  2, the extent  of cross-border
shopping  in  the  Nash  equilibrium  is (Th-tN)/6; part  (a)  then  folllows  from
(4.1).  Part  (b)  is  Immediate  from  (4.2)-(4.3).  I
Both  parts  of  Proposition  6,  counter-intuitive  at  first  blush,  emphasise  the
centrality  of strategic  responses  In shaping  the  non-cooperative  outcome.
For part (a),  one might  have  expected  an increase  in transport  costs  to
reduce  the  extent  of cross-border  shopping.  But  such  an increase  enables
the  large  country  to raise  Its  tax  rate  with  less  fear  of losing  sales  to
the  other  jurisdiction;  and  this  Increase  In  T in  turn  enables  the  smaller
country  to  raise  Its  tax  rate  without  driving  trade  back  over  the  border.
In  the  present  simple  model,  best  responses  are  such  that  the  net  effect  is
to leave  cross-border  shopping  entirely  unaffected.  For part (b),  It Is
clear  enough  that  the large  country  would  benefit  from  an Increase  In 8,
since  the  open  border  leads  to  a  very  tangible  erosion  of  Its  tax  base. It
Is much less  obvious,  however,  that  the  same is also  true  of the small
country,  which  gains  revenue  from  cross-border  shopping. Indeed  we have
seen that  simply  closing  the border  may reduce  the  small  country's  tax
revenue. But for the reason  just  given  an Increase  In transport  costs
should  not  be thought  of as like  moving  some  way towards  a world  In  which
the  border  is  closed. By encouraging  the  large  country  to  raise  its  tax
rate,  it  enables  the  small  country  to  raise  its  tax  rate  too  without  losing
custom;  and  thus  It  will  find  its  revenue  Increased.
While  the  sharpness  of  Proposition  6  may  not  survive  in  more  general  models,
the lesson  is simple  and clear:  once account  Is taken  of strategic
responses  In tax-setting,  increasing  transport  costs  may have relatively
little  effect  on the  extent  of cross-border  shopping,  and  consequently  even
tax haven  countries  that  apparently  gain  from  cross-shopping  may benefit
from  measures  that  make  It  more  costly.
The significance  of relative  size  also  proves  striking. Holding  global
population  h+H  constant,  differentiation  of (4.2)-(4.3)  shows  that  starting
from  any  position  In  which  e  < 1  a small  increase  in  0 leads  to  higher  tax
revenue  in  both  countries.26  In  this  sense:
For  6  >  1/2,  a  reduction  In  v dlspersIon  of  this  klnd  can  also  be  shown  to
16EBQMITfINZ:  Reducing  the  disparity  between  the  sizes  of  the  two
countries  is  strictly  Pateto  'improving.
The large  country  would  rather  be somewhat  smaller;  for Instance,  because
although  this  would  reduce  the size  of Its 'captive'  domestic  market  the
under-cutting  by its  neighbour  would  become  sufficiently  less  aggressive  to
more  than  compensate.  For  the  small  country,  exactly  the  reverse  reasoning
applies:  though  it  gains  from  cross-border  shopping,  it  would  rather  have  a
larger  domestic  market  to  exploit. The Implication  Is  striking. Opening
the  borders  may  or  may  not  be  to  the  smaller  country's  advantage.  Once  the
border Is open, however,  the asymmetry  between  the sizes of the two
countries  is  in  Itself  unambiguously  a  source  of  harm  to  both.
The  last  and  central  property  of the  Nash  equilibrium  is  its  inefficiency.
This  Is  characterised  In:
PROPOSITION  8:  For  e  < 1,  a  'small'  multilateral  reform  (dt,dT)  from  the
Nash  equilibrium  is  strictly  Pareto  improving  iff  dt>O and dT>O.
Proof: With  t';  < TN,  both  revenue  functions  are  differentiable  at the  Nash
equilibrium.  The  effect  on home  revenue  of an arbitrary  small  reform  is
thus
dr  =  rt(  t  ,T)dt  + r  T(t,T")dT  ,  (4.6)
the  subscripts  denoting  differentiation.  Since  tN  =  t(T 1 ),
rt(tN,TN)  =  0 . (4.7)
In the  neighbourhood  of {t  ,TN},  revenue  In the  home  country  Is given  by
(3.2b),  and  hence
r  (tN  T  )  = t  H/6  (4.8)
T
Combining  (4.6)-(4.8),  the  effect  on home  revenue  of a small  multilateral
reform  from  the  Nash  equilibrium  is  dr  = (t  H/8)dT,  and  so  has  the  same  sign
as  dT.  The  argument  for  the  foreign  country  is  analogous,  remembering  that
revenue  there  is  given  locally  by  the  analogue  of (3.2a).  J
Increase  per capita  revenue  In  both  countries.
17Unrestricted  tax competition  thus leads  to tax rates that  are unambiguously
too low.27 The reason  is obvious:  when choosing  Its tax rate,  each country
Ignores  the  beneficial  effect  that raising  it would  have on the revenues  of
the  other  country  by pushing  cross-border  trade  In its  direction.
This  inefficiency  creates  scope  for mutually  advantageous  cooperation. For
'small'  tax changes from asymmetric  equilibria,  Proposition  8 provides a
complete characterisation  of  mutually advantageous coordinated domestic
reforms.  The practical  policy  issues,  however,  are ones in  which reform  is
discrete  rather than marginal:  harmonization  of excises on cigarettes  all
the way to a common rate,  for instance,  rather  than a little  way in that
general direction.  For such reforms  one loses the analytical  simplicity
that (4.7)  brings  for local  reforms  around  the non-cooperative  equilibrium.
The simplicity  of our model, however,  makes it well-suited  to the global
analysis  required  for  non-marginal  reforms  of the  kind In  prospect.
5.  Policies  of tax  coordination
We consider in  turn the  two strategies  around which particular policy
Interest  is currently  focussed:  harmonization,  and the  Imposition  of minimum
rate.  The  benchmark is  In each  case the  non-cooperative  equilibrium
discussed above.  For simplicity,  we also assume throughout  this section
that v =  V =  m,  the qualifications  that relaxing  this requires  being, for
the  most  part,  obvious.
5.1 Tax  harmonisation
Suppose the two  countries set a  common tax rate, r.  This eliminates
cross-border  shopping,  giving  revenues  of
r  = Th  ;  R  =TH.  (5.1)
Since revenue  in each country  is strictly  Increasing  In  T,  there  exists  for
each of them  a critical  level  of the  harmonized  rate  such  that  their  revenue
exceeds  that In the  Nash  equilibrium  iff  T  exceeds  that  level.  In  practice,
This  IS  analogous  to  a  result.  of  de  Crombrugghe  and  Tulkens  (1990)  for  the
model  of  Hintz  and  Tulkens  (1986).
18harmonization  proposals  typically  envisage  convergence  at  or  around  a  common
rate  calculated  as  some  kind  of..wetghted  average  of  the  initial  tax  rates.28
Particular  Importance  thus  attaches  to  the  position  of  these  critical  levels
relative  to the  tax  rates  of the  non-cooperative  equilibrium,  and it  Is  on
this  that  we  focus.
Consider  flrst  the  small  country. If  harmonization  were  at the  higher  of
the  Nash  taxes  Its  revenue  would  be
rr  =  r(TN  TM)  <  r[t(  T'),T  T  3  r(t.T")  rN  ,  (5.2)
(the  strict  Inequality  being  from  uniqueness  of the  best  response  to  ):
relative  to the  non-cooperative  equilibrium,  revenue  In the  small  country
would  fall. Since  rT Is  strictly  increasing  In  T  we  thus  have  an  extremely
sharp  result:
PROPOSITION  9:  Harmonisation  to  any  T  between  the  Nash  equilibrium  tax
rates  is  certain  to  harm  the  small  country.
For  the  large  country  on  the  other  hand,  harmonization  to  the  higher  of the
non-cooperative  tax  rates  would  clearly  be  beneficial:  it  would  gain  revenue
from  those  of its  residents  who  cross-shop  in  the  Nash  equilibrium  without
losing  any  from  those  who shop  domestically.  By an argument  analogous  to
that  in (5.2),  harmonization  to  the  lower  of the  Nash  taxes,  In contrast,
would reduce  revenue  In the large  country  below its level  In the Nash
equilibrium.  Hence:
PROPOSITION  10:  There  exists  T  i  (t  ,7T)  such  that  the  large  country
benefits  from  harmonization  to  r  iff  '  > T.
Both  countries  thus  have  cause  to  fear  harmonization.  When the  point  of
convergence  Is calculated  as some  weighted  average  of the  non-cooperative
tax  rates,  the  small  country  is  bound  to  lose;  If  sufficiently  high  weight
is  attached  to  the  lower  of  the  Nash  taxes,  so  too  will  the  large.
2STh  Is  explIcIt,  for  Instance,  In  the  European  Commlssion's  1987
proposals.
19The thrust  of Propositions  9 and 10, It should  be emphasised,  is in exactly
the opposite  direction to much of.  the recent literature,  on harmonization.
!n particular, It  Is  shown  In  Keen  (1989)  that when  the  destination
principle  applies harmonization 29 from  the  non-cooperative equilibrium
Increases welfare in both countries.  Though the two models are  very
different  - particularly  In the criterion  used to evaluate  reforms - this
contrast points to the centrality  of cross-border  shopping In evaluating
practical proposals for tax coordination:  measures that seem attractive
when the  destination  principle  is enforced  may  well cease to be so when It
is  not. 30
5.2  A minimum tax rate
Suppose Instead  that some lower  bound  g Is imposed  on the tax rate that a
country  may  choose. The interesting  case Is that  in  which  this  minimum  lies
between  the  non-cooperative  tax  rates,  and  we therefore  take  it that
tN  <  M  < TN  (5.3)
The first task is  to characterise the new  non-cooperative  equilibrium,
Illustrated  in Figure 4.  Consider then the Impact of the minimum tax
constraint  on the best response  functions  of the two  countries.  Two simple
observations  are helpful.  First,  attention  can of course  be restricted  to
best responses to tax rates no less than I.  Second, wherever the best
response  in  the  absence  of the  constraint  Is  to set  a tax  no less  than  A  the
best response  function  will be unaffected. The Implications  of the  minimum
tax  for  the  best  response function of  the  large  country are  then
straightforward. Recalling (3.5),  the best response  function  of the large
country  in the  unconstrained  case,  T(t),  Is  strictly  increasing. Then  using
(5.3)
To an appropriately  weighted  average  of  Initial tax  rates.
30Prospects  are  less  gloomy  In  terms  of  Joint  revenue:  It  can  be  shown  that
there  exists  T  between  the  Nash  rates  such  that  harmonization to  any  rate  at
or  above  T  Increases  total  revenue  across  the  two  countries.  This  Is  more
In  keeping  with  the  corresponding  results  for  the  case  In  whch  the
destination  principle  Is  maintained:  whatever  the  starting  point  of  reform,
harmonization  to  an  appropriately  weighted  average  of  initlal  tax  rate.  ts
then  potentially  Pareto-improving  (Keen  (1987),  Turunen-Red  and  Woodland
(1990)).
20T(t)  I  T(gu)  > T(tN)  =  T> p ;  V t  >  (5.4)
and so, by the preceding  observations,  the only effect  of the minimum tax
constraint  is to remove  the  segment  corresponding  to t <  p.
Matters are more complex for the small country.  Recall Figure 3 for the
unconstrained  case, and Imagine  increasing  T from a low level.  When the
jump point at T =  85/ Is reached,  the  home country  would like to switch  to
the lower  segment  of Its  best response  function. But the  tax rate It  would
N wish to charge, being lower than t ,  violates  the minimum tax constraint.
So  It Is now optimal for the home country to continue  over-cutting  the
large,  extending the upper segment of the best response function.  As T
continues  to  increase, however,  there  will  come  a  point  at  which
under-cutting  becomes  desirable  even though  It  can  go no lower  than  i.  This
point  will come  before  the  T is  reached  at  which  the  home country  would  have
wished  to  set  a  tax  of  p  even  In  the  absence of  the  constraint.
Intuitively,  if the tax that the home country  would  have wished to set Is
only just below the minimum  then it will be better to charge  that minimum
than to switch  discontinuously  to over-cutting;  somewhat  more formally,  if
it were not optimal to switch before the point at which p  is the best
unconstrained  response  then the initial  best response  function  would have
had to have been discontinuous  there too.  Geometrically,  the  effect  of the
minimum  tax  constraint  on the  best response  function  of the  small  country  is
thus to move the jump point to the right and rotate  the left part of the
lower  segment  clockwise  to  give a portion  horizontal  at  p: see  Figure  4.
With the 'hole'  in the small  country's  best response  function  moving  to the
right  and that  of the  larger  country  being  unchanged  in the  relevant  region,
the existence of a Nash equilibrium Is now problematic.  If however an
equilibrium  does exist 31 then it must be at a point like E  In Figure 4.
More precisely:
PROPOSITION  11:  In the  presence  of a minimum  tax  constraint  as in (5.3),
there  can  be  no  more  than one  Nash equilibrium.  Taxes  at  such  an
equilibrium  are:
The conditions  which ensure  this  are not especially  enlightening.
21t'  (5.5)
eu =  J.3  +  A)  .t(5.6)
_o:  Note  first  that  at least  one of the  countries  must  set Its tax
exactly  at #A  In  equilibrium;  otherwise,  by the  second  of the  observations
above,  the equilibrium  would  be at an intersection  of the  best response
correspondences  unrestricted  by the  minimum  tax  condition;  and this,  from
the  uniqueness  aspect  of  Proposition  1,  is  ruled  out  by (5.3).
Since  to  >  p by the  minimum  tax  constraint,  (5.4)  implies  that  T'  >  u.  So
it  must  be that  tm  =  p.  Recalling  that  in the  relevant  range  the  large
country's  reaction  function  is  as In  (3.5),  and  noting  from  (5.3)  and  (3.7)
that  p <  8,  Tm  must  then  be  as  In  (5.6).  H
In  equilibrium  the  small  country  thus  sets  exactly  the  minimum  permissible,
and  continues  to  undercut  the  large.
Consider  then  the  impact  of the  minimum  tax  constraint  on the  tax  revenues
of the two countries,  the comparison  again  being  with the  outcome  under
unrestricted  tax  competition.  Both  now  set  higher  tax  rates. The  Increase
Is  greater  for  the  small  country,  however,  than  It  is  for  the  large:  this  is
clear  from  Figure  4, and  easy  to check.  Thus  the  volume  of cross-border
shopping  falls.  Revenue  will therefore  certainly  increase  in the large
country,  but  once  again  the  effect  on  the  small  country  Is  unclear.  revenue
is gained  on sales to Its own residents  but lost through  diminished
cross-shopping.  The following  shows,  however,  that the first  of these
effects  dominates,  so  that  the  small  country  will  also  gain:
PROPOSITION  12: Suppose  6  < 1,  so that  the  two  countries  set  different  tax
rates  in  the  unrestricted  Hash  equilibrium.  Then  imposing  as  a  minimum  any
tax that lies between  those  rates (and for which there  exists  a Nash
equilibrium)  is  strictly  Pareto  improving.
Proof. The  argument  for  the  large  country  is straightforward,  so  we deal
only  with the small.  Using (5.5)-(5.6)  in (3.2b),  home revenue  In the
restricted  Nash  equilibrium,  regarded  as  a  function  of  p,  can  be  written  as
m(g)  ={(1+2e)p - }2/28  (5.7)
22This Is strictly  concave  In  j,  and so since  Is  lies  between  the two  Nash
taxes
ra(&)  >  minlr(tN),r(TN)I  . (5.8)
'.  N  N Recalling  (4.2)  It  Is  straightforward  to  show  that  r  (t  r  : Imposing  the
lower  of  the  Nash  taxes  as  a  minimum  leaves  the  equilibrium  - and  hence  also
tax  revenues  - undisturbed.  One  also  finds  that  ra(TN)-r  N _  e(1-e)8H/6  > 0,
and  the  conclusion  then  follows  from  (5.8).  9
This  Is  a remarkably  strong  result. Comparing  It  with  Propositions  9 and
10,  In  particular,  establishes  a  clear  dominance  of  the  minimum  tax  strategy
over  that of  harmonization.  Whereas harmonising  to  any  tax  rate
intermediate  to those  of the  unrestricted  Nash  equilibrium  Is certain  to
harm  the  small  country  and  may  also  harm  the  large,  Imposing  that  same  rate
as  a  minimum  will  be to  the  benefit  of  both.
Note  though  that  higher  minimum  tax  rates  do  not  necessarily  Pareto-dominate
lower  ones. Revenue  in  the  large  country  always  Increase  with  i,  but,  from
(5.7)  and  (3.6),  that  In  the  small  decreases  once  jA > (3/2)t  . Using  (3.6)
and (3.7),  It follows  that  for e  < .25  revenue  in  the  small  country  will
eventually  begin  to  fall  as  g.  rises  towards  T:  If  the  differential  in  size
is  suZfgciently  great,  there  comes  a  point  at  which  the  loss  of  cross-border
trade  dominates  the  increased  receipts  from  purchases  by residents.  While
revenue  In  the  small  country  cannot  fall  below  its  level  under  unrestricted
tax  competition,  there  may  nevertheless  be a conflict  of interest  between
the  two  countries  in  the  choice  of  the  minimum.  This  In  turn  Is  a reminder
that  the  minimum  tax  strategy,  despite  Its  dominance  over  harmonization,  is
unlikely  to  achieve  a fully  optimal  outcome.
6. Optimal  taxation  in  the  presence  of  cross-border  shopping
When  the  border  Is  closed,  the  coope  ative  and  non-cooperative  solutions  to
the  governments'  optimisation  problems  coincide:  each  sets  Its  tax  at the
reservation  price  of Its  own residents. Having  examined  the  effects  of
opening  the  border  on the  non-cooperative  outcome  and  of some  particular
measures  of coordination,  we  consider  now  its  implications  for  cooperative
23tax  design;  the  nature, that  Is,  of optimal  coordination.
Two criteria  of optimality  are of particular  interest. The first is Pareto
efficiency, aaximibsLng  the revenue  of one country  conditional  on securing
some given level of revenue  for the other.  This can be shown to require
that at least one country tax exacLiy at Its own residents'  reservation
price,  but beyond that leads to few particularly  instructive  Insights.  We
therefore  focus on a second  and stronger  criterion,  that of Joint revenue
maximisation.  32 From  this perspective the  opening of  the  border  Is
unambiguously  damaging:  when It Is closed  and taxes  set as  in  (2.3),  Joint
revenue is at the upper bound Imposed  by reservation  prices. Except when
reservation  prices happen to  be the same In the two  countries,  opening the
border  whilst retaining taxes at these levels  must lead to a dilution  of
revenue through cross-border  shopping.  The problem then Is to find the
pattern  of tax rates  that maximises  Joint  revenue  subject  to the constraint
Imposed  by consumers'  freedom  to cross-shop.
To do this  we now drop the  convention  that  0  I  1 and Instead  label  countries
so that  V > v.  Denoting  an optimal  tax  structure  by {t:,T}I,  the  subscript
indicating  the  open border,  the  optimal  tax structure  Is then characterised
in:
PROPOSITION  13: Joint  revenue  maximisation  requires  that  the  tax  structure
be of one of the  folloaing  forms:
*  *
TYPE  C:  t  =  v  and  T  =V;
o  0
TYPE  I:  t  = v  and  T  v +  6/2;
o  0
33  IE  *
TYPE  H:  t  T  V.
0  0
It  is  of  type  C 1ff
V <  min[6/2  + v, v +48-)1 . (6.1)
of  type  H 1ff
V > max(6/4  + (1+0)v,  v+v.1-e . (6.2)
Belglum  and  Luxembourg,  Interestingly,  do  Indeed  have  a  revenue-sharing
agreement  covering  most Indirect  taxes  other  than  VAT.
In  this  case  the  optimal  t  Is  not  unique, since with  T  a  V  any  t  >  V  will
lead  to  the  same  equilibrium.  -For  clarityr  we  eliminate  this  redundancv  In
stating  the result.
24and  of  type  I  otherwise.
Progf:  See Appendix.
There  are thus  only three  possibilities.  The  first,  a type  C optimum,  is to
retain taxes at exactly the levels chat are optimal when the border is
closed: the best response to the cross-border  shopping  that opening the
border Induces  may be not to respond  at all.  The second, type I, is to
continue  to charge the reservation  price in the low valuation  country  but
reduce  the tax  In the  high valuation  country  to  a level  intermediate  between
the two reservation  prices: cross-border  shopping  is diminished,  but not
eliminated.  The  third, type H,  Is to harmonise at  the higher of  the
reservation  prices:  squeezing  the low  valuation  consumers  out of purchasing
altogether  in  order  to safeguard  revenue  from  the  high  valuation.
The Intuition  behind  this  characterisation  of the  optimum  can  be brought  out
from Figure 5.  Drawn conditionally  on 6  and e,  this shows the regions  In
(v,V)  space  corresponding  to the three  types  of  optimum. Consider  then  some
particular  v and Imagine  Increasing  V from V =  v. With taxes retained  at
their  closed  border  levels,  a proportion  (V-v)/S  of high  valuation  consumers
will shop In the low tax  country.  34  The revenue  cost of this,  however,  Is
Initially  less than the  first-order  loss  of revenue  that  would result  from
reducing  T  in order to stem the flow of cross-shopping. It thus remains
optimal  to set taxes  at their  closed  border  levels:  the  Type C optimum. The
implications  of further Increases  In V depend  on the level  of ve, which  can
be  thought of  as measuring the  taxable capacity of  the  low valuation
country.
If vO > 8/4 there  comes  a point  at which  the  extent  of cross-border  shopping
is so great that it becomes  optimal to set T < V, foregoing  some revenue
from those foreign consumers who  shop domestically In order to  switch
purchases  by some  of the  others  back to the  high tax  country. At this  point
- which arrives when exactly half of the high valuation consumers shop
abroad  - the  optimum  becomes  that  of Type I.  As V continues  to increase  the
optimal  tax rates  remain  for  some  while  entirely  unchanged,  and  hence  so too
Note  that  Al  and  A2  ensure  (V-v0/8  <  1.
25does the  extent  of cross-border  shopping:  remarkably,  the  level to which It
is optimal to  lower T  in response to the dilution of revenue through
cross-border shopping is independent  of V.  For V  sufficiently large,
however,  the loss of revenue  implicit  in leaving  high valuation  consumers
with  strictly positive surplus outweighs the  revenue gained from  low
valuation  consumers  by keeping  the  tax  rate they  face sufficiently  low that
they  continue  to purchase. The  optimum  then  becomes  that  of Type H: both t
and T are raised  discontinuously  to V In order to extract  the maximum  from
the  high valuation  consumers.
The story Is rather  different  If the taxable  capacity  of the low valuation
country  Is also low, In the  sense  that  ve < a/4.  In this  case It Is easily
seen from (6.1)-(6.2)  that the  optimum  cannot  be of Type I.  Instead  it Is
always  optimal  to set  T =  V: responding  to  cross-border  shopping,  If at all,
not  by  foregoing some  revenue on  high  valuation consumers who  shop
domestically  but  by foregoing  all revenue  on low  valuation  consumers.
The role of the transport  cost parameter  a  in determining  the optimal tax
structure  can  also  be seen  from  Figure  5.  As 6 -)  O the  region  corresponding
to a Type C optimum  vanishes.  In the limit,  the  optimal  structure  is thus
one in which taxes  are harmonised,  either  at the  higher  of the reservation
prices  or (recalling  that T =  v +  8/2 In a Type I optimum)  at the lower.
Which of these it will be depends on the relative  sizes and reservation
prices  of the two countries: harmonization  will optimally  be at the lower
of the  reservation  prices  iff  the  relative  size  of the  low  valuation  country
exceeds (V-v)/v,  the proportion  by which the lower  reservation  price falls
short  of the  higher.
7. Conclusion
Consider  again  the  questions  raised  at the  outset. Which  kinds  of countries
choose to become tax havens?  Here we have focused  on the role of size,
showing that it Introduces  a fundamental  asymmetry  into the best response
patterns  of  small  and  large  countries:  the  model  has  a  unique
non-cooperative  equilibrium  in  which  the  smaller  country  charges  a lower  tax
than the large (Proposition  2).  Even more strikingly,  differences  in size
26have  been seen  to  exacerbate  the  inefficlencies  of  non-cooperative
behaviour.  Tax  competition  between,  countries  identical  In  slze  leads  to  an
Inefficient  outcome. But  when  countries  differ  In  size  the  outcome  Is  even
worse: the  small  country  would  prefer  to  be  rather  larger,  and the  larger
to  be  rather  smaller  (Proposition  7).
What  Is  the  likely  pattern  of taxation  ln  a border-free  Europe  of 1992  if
tax  competition  Is unrestricted?  The smaller  country  not  only  charges  a
lower  tax  rate  than  does  the  large  In  our  non-cooperative  equilibrium,  it
also  ends  up  with  less  tax  revenue.  It  receives,  however, a
disproportionately  large share  of collective  tax revenue:  per capita
expenditure  on  public  goods  is  higher  In  the  tax  haven  country  (Proposition
5). Opening  the  borders  - more  precisely,  moving  from  a situation  In  which
the  destination  principle  is  enforced  to  one  In  which  It  is  not  - leads  to  a
loss  of  revenue  In  the  large  country.  More  surprisingly,  the  same  may  also
be true  of  the  small  country,  despite  the  revenue  It  gains  from  cross-border
shopping  (Proposition  4).
Are  there  mutually  advantageous  forms  of  coordination?  Simple  harmonization
of  the  kind  often  proposed  has  emerged  In  a  very  unfavourable  light:  even  if
the common  rate adopted  Is that which the large  country  sets in the
non-cooperative  equilibrium,  the revenue  gained  from its own residents'
purchases  Is  insufficient  to  compensate  the  smaller  country  for  the  loss  of
cross-border  trade  (Proposition  9).  The  Imposition  of  a minimum  tax  rate,
in  contrast,  benefits  both  countries:  the  strategic  response  of the  large
country  is  such  as to  ensure  that  sufficient  cross-border  shopping  remains
for the  small  country  also  to  gain (Proposition  12).  In the  context  of
US-Mexico  free  trade,  for  example,  the  negotiation  of lower  bounds  on key
tax  rates  may  prove  mutually  advantageous.
How does Increased  International  mobility  affect  optimal  domestic  tax
structures?  In terms  of collective  optimality,  the  answer  could  well  be:
not  at  all (Propositlon  13). The  first  order  revenue  loss  Incurred  if the
large'  country  cuts Its domestic  tax rate in order to stem the flow of
cross-border  trade  may  outweigh  the  dilution  of  collective  revenue  that  such
trade  implies.
27The  direct  applicability  of  these  and  our  other  results  is  naturally  limited
by the  special  structure  of the  model. They  are  nevertheless  suggestive.
They  emphasise,  In  particular,  the  Importance  of recognising  the  strategic
context  in  which  measures  of  coordination  must  be  assessed.  Ignoring  these
can lead  to seriously  misleading  conclusions.  One  example  of this  Is the
minimum  tax  result  referred  to  above. Another  is  the  finding  that  making
cross-border  shopping  more  difficult  (without  going  so  far  as to  eliminate
It)  may  be to  the  benefit  of  the 'tax  haven'  country  (Proposition  6):  the
consequent  Increase  In  taxation  in  the  larger  country  enables  the  smaller  to
Increase  its  own tax rate  without  diminishing  the  volume  of cross-border
trade.  Simple  models  of the  kind  developed  here cannot  provide  precise
recommendations  for  the  design  of  tax  cooperation  and  free  trade  agreements.
Our purpose  has rather  been to sharpen  the Intuition  needed  for these
difficult  and  Increasingly  pressing  tasks.
28APPENDIX
Derivatlon  of (3.3)-(3.4). This proceeds  In three  steps.  The first Is to
find the optimal t and associated  tax revenue  when the home country is
artificially  constrained to charge at least as high a  tax rate as the
foreign  government;  to consider,  that  is,  the  problem
Mtx r(t,T)  subJect  to  t t  T
This  gives
t  0(6  + T)  ;  T s 8  (A.la)
ttiT) 
T  ;  T  m 6  (A.lb)
and  maximised  revenue
T  s  8  (A.2a)
r[tI(T),T]  =
hT  ;  T  6  . (A.2b)
The second Is to repeat the exercise with the home government instead
constrained  to under-cut  the  foreign. Solving
max r(t,T)  subJect  to t s T
one  finds that  In this  case
2  f  T  ;  T s  60  (A.3a)
t  (T)  =
J(68  + T)  ;  T a  9  (A.3b)
hT  ;  T s  89  (A.4a)
r(t2(T),T]  =2H~6 rlt2(T)T  =  (6)  v  )  ;  T > .5  . (A.4b)
The final step is to compare  for all T the maximised  revenues  under these
constrained  problems  in order to identify  the  optimum  for the  unconstrained
one.  Partitioning  the range  of T, there  are  four  possibilities  to consider:
(a)  For T <  min[6,661, comparing (A.2a)  and (A.4a)  gives, after some
rearrangement  (and  In obvious  notation)
rl  - r  2  h(T-6)2/64  >  °
and so,  from (A.la),  t(T)  =  J(6+T).
(b)  For  T > max[8,869,  (A.2b)  and (A.4b)  give
29rI  - r2 - -H(88-T) 2/84  0
and  so,  from  CA.3b),  t(T)  =  J(88+T)'.
(c)  If  I  2 1  then  for  Te[8.691  one  finds  from.  (A2b) and (A.4a)  that
r - r 2, and  hence  tlT)  =  T.
(d) If  e  < 1  then  for  Te[58,61  one  has  from  (A.2a)  and  (A.4b)  that
ri  - r 2 = H(1-e)(6  2 T2  )/84
and  so  from  (A.1a)  and (A.3b)
J(8  +  T)  ;  8G  T  s8i 4
t(T)  =
i(  e  + T)  ;  ari<T:8  .
Piecing  together  ta)-Cd)  gives  (3.3)-(3.4).  |
Proof  of  Proposition  2:  This  involves  a series  of lemmas,  which  we state
and prove  from  the perspective  of the  home  country. They  make no use,
however,  of the labelling  0 c 1 In Sections  3-5 of the text,  so exact
analogues  apply  to  the  foreign  country.
Denote  by  ru(t,T)  and  t"(T)  respectively  the  home  country's  revenue  function
and best response  correspondence  conditional  on some  particular  pair of
finite  reservation  prices:  for  brevity,  we  omit  these  as  arguments.  Then:
Lemma  1: r (t,T)  < r(t,T),  with  equality  if  t  < v  and T C  V.
Proof:  The weak inequality  is obvious:  introducing  finite  reservation
prices  cannot  increase  revenue.  That  the  equality  holds  if  each  country's
tax Is  below  the  reservation  price  of Its  own  residents  follows  on noting
that each consumer's  purchase  decision  will then be  exactly as  If
reservation  prices  were Infinite:  cross-shoppers  will  be unaffected,  since
If  the  price  in  their  own  country  Is  below  their  reservation  price  then  so
must  be  the  (lower)  effective  price  they  face  in  shopping  abroad. |
Lemma  2: If  t(T)  < v  and T < V than  t  (T)  t(T).
Proof: Immediate  from  Lemma  1.  Q
Lemma  3: r[tt(T),tt  > O,  V T 2.
30Eof:  The home country  can always  secure  strictly  positive  revenue  by
setting  t  e (O,min[v,  T+81). a
Lem  4:  If  A2 holds  (W  < 2v  )  then  tU(T)S Sv, V T <  V.
Er2of:  Suppose  that  for  some  T' < V, t'  =  tv(T')  > v.  All  home  revenue
must then  come  from  cross-shoppers.  There  are then  two  possibilities  to
consider.  The  first  is  that  t'  >  T'.  But  then  home  revenue  Is  zero,  so  by
Lemma  3 t' cannot  be a best response. If t' < T,  home revenue  In a
neighbourhood  around  t'  Is
r (t,  T'1  )t  tH  F:-H)  tA.5)
differentiation  of  which  gives
rv(t',T')  = H(T'-2t')/8
< H(v  -2v  )/8
<  O,
the  first  Inequality  being  from  T'  < V < v  and  t'  > v  > v  . Thus  t'  cannot
be  a  best  response  to  T'. f
Lem  5: If  A2 holds  then  tu(T)  < t(T),  V T  < V.
Proof: Immediate  from  Lemmas  2  and  4. J
Lenma  6:  If  AZ holds  then  in  any  Nash equilibrium  (t,T'),  t'  < v  and  T'  < V.
Proof: Suppose  t'  = t  (T')  > v.  Then  T'  >  V  (by  Lemma  4)  and  so  T' <t'
(by  Lemma  3). But  then  rCV(t',T')  =  0,  contradicting  Lemma  3. f
Consider  then  the  structure  of  t (T). From  (3.3),  t(T)  <  6  iff  T < 6(2-e).
By Al, t(T)  < v  throughout  this  range.  By Lemma  6, attention  can be
restricted  to  T < V, and  so  by Lemma  2 t (T)  = t(T)  In (the  relevant  part
of)  this  range. Above  T  = 6(2-e),  (3.3)  gives  t(T)  < T.  Thus,  using  Lemma
5,  for  T <  V
(T)  =  {  (T)  = t(T)  <  8  ;  T  <  6(2-0)  (A.6)
ga(T)  < t(T)  <  T  ;  T  >  5(2-0)
Arguing  similarly  for  the  large  country  gives
31TCt) a  {  GI(t)  T(t) j  8  ; t  <8  (A)
Ga(t)  <  T(t)  <  t  ;  t  >  8
for  t <  v.  Since  TN  < 8(2-e)  and  t  <  6,  Proposition  1  implies  that  gl  and
GI  Intersect  exactly  once,  at  the  rates  of (3.6)-t3.7).  By  Al,  {t'.9)  thus
remains  an  equilibrium.  The  proof  Is  completed  by  precluding  the  only  other
kinds of equilibria  permitted  by  (A.6)  and  (A.7):  g1 and G2 cannot
Intersect  since  t <  6  on the  former  but  t > 6 on the latter; g2 and  G,
cannot  intersect  because  T > 8  on the  former  but  T < 8  on the  latter; g2
ana  G2  cannot  intersect  because  t  <  T  on  the  former  but  t  >  T  on the  latter.
an
Proof  of  Proposition  13:  If  v  =  V then  it  is  Immediate  that  the  optimum  Is
of  Type  C.  Consider  then  the  case  In  which  V >  v.  That  the  optimum  must  of
one  of  the  forms  in  the  Proposition  follows  from  the  next  three  lemmas:
Lemma  7:  t  >v
Proof: Suppose  that  t  <  v,  and  consider  the  two  possibilities:
(1)  If  T <  t  then  for  any  £  4  (O.v-t)  the  reform  dt  = dT  =  c  would  have  no
effect  on  any  consumer's  purchase  decision:  none  would  cease  to  purchase  the
good, since  prices  remain  below  both reservation  prices  (including  the
effective  prices  faced  by  cross-shoppers),  and  no  consumer  would  switch  the
jurisdiction  of their  purchase  (since  this choice  depends  only on the
difference  t-T). The  reform  thus  Increases  the  tax  that  each  consumer  pays,
and  hence  so  too  total  tax  revenue.
(ll)  If  T > t  no  home  consumer  shops  abroad. If  moreover  V  >  T then  for  C
small  enough  a reform  of the  kind  In  part  (1)  must  again  increase  revenue.
This  leaves  only the  possibility  that  T b  V.  Home  revenue  is then  as In
(3.2b)  and  foreign  as  in  the  analogue  of (3.2b),  and  hence  total  revenue  is
r  + R  =  th  +  VH  - (V)(V  _ t) 2
which',  since  t  <  V,  is  strictly  increasing  In  t.  |
Lemma  8:  If  t  > v  then  t  > T  V
32Proof:  With t  >  v home consumers  buy, if at all, in the foreign  country.
o  0
Then It Is straightforward  to show that  T  I  V: otherwise  revenue  would be
e  0  ~~~~~~~0 
zero (if  t  > V)  or (if  to<  V)  lower  than  It  would  be at  T - V.  That t
> T  follows on noting that with T > t > v collective  revenue  would be
Increased  by raising  t: since  there  are  no purchases  by home consumers,  this
would  simply  extract  more from  foreign  cross-shoppers.
*  le  0
With t  >  To there remain two possibilities. The flrst Is that T  <s  v.
Collective  revenue  Is then  no greater  than  v(h+H);  but  more than  this  can be
raised  by setting  t =  v and  T = t+c,  for  c > 0 and sufficiently  small.  The
second  Is that  T  > v.  Collective  revenue  in such  a regime  Is T H, and so
is  maximised  by setting  t  > T  =  V.  j
0  ~~0 0
Lemma  9:  If  t  =  v  then  T  = minlv  + 5/2,  V].
Proof:  Fixing  t = v, again  consider  the  two  possibilities:
i) With  T <  t, total  revenue  Is
r + R - vh + TH  - (h3(v  - T) 2
and so is  strictly  increasing  in  T.
(ll) With T > t, If T > V then  revenue  would  be increased  by setting  T =
t+c,  for  small  enough  c > 0.  If  T < V total  revenue  is
(  )
r  + R = vh  + TH  - (~IT  - v)',
which Is  strictly  Increasing  (decreasing)  In  T for  T < (>)  v + 5/2. 
It remains  to establish  conditions  (6.1)-(6.2). Note first that if V = v
then the optimality of  a  Type C  solution is  indeed Implied by  (6.1).
Suppose  then  that V > v.  Denoting  total  revenue  at a Type I optimum  by E 1,
it is straightforward  to show that
Ec  y=  tvO  + V - (V-v) 2/6]H  (A.8)
I  (  [v(1+e)  +  8/41H  (A.9)
E  =  VH . (A.10)
By the  argument  In part (11)  of Lemma 9, the  Type C solution  dominates  the
type I  whenever v+(a/2) exceeds V.  Comparing Ec with ZH  then gives
condition (6.1).  The optimum is of Type H lff  ZE  exceeds  both EI and  c
and this,  from (A.8)-(A.10),  Is  equivalent  to (6.2). Q_E
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